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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 78-2-2(3) (j) 
UCA (1989). 
The nature of the proceeding is an appeal from a final order 
and a final judgment of the District Court deciding that treble 
damages should not be awarded. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented by the appeal are whether or not treble 
damages should be awarded pursuant to the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer statute. The standard of review is the refusal of the 
trial court to give effect to the waiver of objection to 
insufficiency of process provided in Rules 12(b) and (h) URCP. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated, 38-8-3 SELF-SERVICE STORAGE FACILITIES: 
38-8-3. Enforcement of lien - Notice requirements - Sale 
procedure and effect. 
A claim of an owner which has become due against an 
occupant and which is secured by the owner's lien may be 
satisfied as follows: 
(1) No enforcement action may be taken by the owner 
until the occupant has been in default continuously for 
a period of 30 days. 
(2) After the occupant has been in default 
continuously for a period of 3 0 days, the owner may begin 
enforcement action if the occupant has been given notice 
in writing. The notice shall be delivered in person or 
sent by certified mail to the last known address of the 
occupant, and a copy of the notice shall, at the same 
time, be sent to the sheriff of the county where the 
self-service storage facility is located. Any lien 
holder with an interest in the property to be sold or 
otherwise disposed of, of whom the owner has knowledge 
either through the disclosure provision on the rental 
agreement or through the existence of a validly filed and 
perfected UCC-1 financing statement with the Division of 
Corporations and Commercial Code, or through other 
written notification, shall be included in the notice 
process as set forth in this section. 
(3) This notice shall include: 
(a) an itemized statement of the owner's claim 
showing the sum due at the time of the notice and 
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the date when the sum became due; 
(b) a brief and general description of the 
personal property subject to the lien, which 
description shall be reasonably adequate to permit 
the person notified to identify the property; except 
that any container including, but not limited to, 
a trunk, valise, or box that is locked, fastened, 
sealed, or tied in a manner which deters immediate 
access to its contents may be described as such 
without describing its contents; 
(c) a notification of denial of access to the 
personal property, if such denial is permitted under 
the terms of the rental agreement, which 
notification shall provide the name, street address, 
and telephone number of the owner or his designated 
agent whom the occupant may contact to respond to 
the notification; 
(d) a demand for payment within a specified 
time not less than 15 days after delivery of the 
notice; and 
(e) a conspicuous statement that, unless the 
claim is paid within the time stated in the notice, 
the personal property will be advertised for sale 
or other disposition and will be sold or otherwise 
disposed of at a specified time and place. 
(4) Any notice made under this section shall be 
presumed delivered when it is deposited with the United 
States postal service and properly addressed with postage 
prepaid. 
(5) (a) After the expiration of the time given in 
the notice, an advertisement of the sale or 
other disposition shall be published once a 
week for two consecutive weeks in a newspaper 
of general circulation in the county where the 
self-service storage facility is located. The 
advertisement shall include: 
(i) a brief and general description of the 
personal property reasonably adequate to 
permit its identification as provided for 
in Subsection (3)(b); the address of the 
self-service storage facility and the 
number, if any, of the space where the 
personal property is located; and the name 
of the occupant and his last known 
address; and 
(ii) the time, place, and manner of the 
sale or other disposition shall take place 
not sooner than 15 days after the first 
publication, 
(b) If there is no newspaper of general 
circulation in the county where the self-
service storage facility is located, the 
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advertisement Shall be posted at least ten days 
before the date of the sale or other 
disposition in not less than six conspicuous 
places in the neighborhood where the self-
service storage facility is located. 
(6) Any sale or other disposition of the personal 
property shall conform to the terms of the notice 
provided for in this section. 
(7) Any sale or other disposition of the personal 
property shall beheld at the self-service storage 
facility or at the nearest suitable place to where the 
personal property is held or stored. 
(8) Before any sale or other disposition of 
personal property under this section, the occupant may 
pay the amount necessary to satisfy the lien and the 
reasonable expenses incurred under this section and 
thereby redeem the personal property; upon receipt of 
this payment, the owner shall return the personal 
property, and thereafter the owner shall have no 
liability to any person with respect to that personal 
property. 
(9) A purchaser in good faith of the personal 
property sold to satisfy a lien as provided for in this 
chapter takes the property free of any rights of persons 
against whom the lien was valid and free of any rights 
of a secured creditor, despite noncompliance by the owner 
with the requirements of this section. 
(10) In the event of a sale under this section, the 
owner may satisfy his lien for the proceeds of the sale, 
subject to the rights of any prior lienholder; the lien 
rights of the prior lienholder are automatically 
transferred to the proceeds of the sale; if the sale is 
made in good faith and is conducted in a reasonable 
manner, the owner shall not be subject to any surcharge 
for a deficiency in the amount of a prior secured lien, 
but shall hold the balance, if any, for delivery to the 
occupant, lienholder, or other person in interest; if the 
occupant, lienholder, or other person in interest does 
not claim the balance of the proceeds within one year of 
the date of sale, it shall become the property of the 
Utah state treasurer as unclaimed property with no 
further claim against the owner. 
(11) If the requirements of this chapter are not 
satisfied, if the sale of the personal property is not 
in conformity with the notice of sale, or if there is a 
willful violation of this chapter, nothing in this 
section affects the rights and liabilities of the owner, 
occupant, or any other person. 
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Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2(3)(j) Supreme Court jurisdiction: 
78-2-2• Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdition. 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-1 Forcible Entry and Detainer: 
78-36-1. "Forcible entry" defined. 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts of a 
house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by and kind 
of violence or circumstances of terror, enters upon or into 
real property, . . . 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-8 Forcible Entry and Detainer: 
78-36-8. Allegations permitted in complaint - Time for 
appearance - Service of summons. 
The plaintiff in his complaint, in addition to setting 
forth the facts on which he seeks to recover, may set forth 
any circumstances of fraud, force, or violence which may have 
accompanied the alleged forcible entry, or forcible or 
unlawful detainer, and claim damages therefor or compensation 
for the occupation of the premises, or both. If the unlawful 
detainer charged is after default in the payment of rent, the 
complaint shall state the amount of rent due. The court shall 
indorse on the summons the number of days within which the 
defendant is required to appear and defend the action, which 
shall not be less than three or more than 20 days from the 
date of service. The court may authorize service by 
publication or mail for cause shown. Service by publication 
is complete one week after publication. Service by mail is 
complete three days after mailing. The summons shall be 
changed in form to conform to the time of service as ordered, 
and shall be served as in other cases. 
Utah Code Annotated, 78-36-10 Forcible Entry and Detainer: 
78-36-10. Judgment for restitution, damages, and rent -
Immediate enforcement - Treble damages. 
(1) A judgment may be entered upon the merits or upon 
default. A judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff shall 
include an order for the restitution of the premises. If the 
proceeding is for unlawful detainer after neglect or failure 
to perform any condition or covenant of the lease or agreement 
under which the property is held, or after default in the 
payment of rent, the judgment shall also declare the 
forfeiture of the lease or agreement. 
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(2) The iurv or the court, if the proceeding is tried 
without a jury or upon the defendant's default, shall also 
assess the damages resulting to the plaintiff from any of the 
following: 
(a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; 
(c) waste of the premises during the defendant's 
tenancy, if waste is alleged in the complaint and proved 
at trial; and 
(d) the amount of rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer is after default in the payment of rent, 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against the defendant 
for the rent, for three times the amount of the damages 
assessed under Subsection (2)(a) through (2^ fc), and for 
reasonable attorney's fees, if they are provided for in the 
lease or agreement. 
(4) If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer after 
default in the payment of the rent, execution upon the 
judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the 
judgment* In all cases, the judgment may be issued and 
enforced immediately. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1: 
Rule 1. General provisions. 
(a) Scope of rules. These rules shall govern the 
procedure in the Supreme Court, the district courts, the 
circuit courts, and the justice courts of the state of Utah 
in all actions, suits, and proceedings of a civil nature, 
whether cognizable at law or in equity, and in all special 
statutory proceedings, except as governed by other rules 
promulgated by this court or enacted by the Legislature and 
except as stated in Rule 81. They shall be liberally 
construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action. 
(b) Effective date. These rules shall take effect on 
January 1, 1950; and thereafter all laws in conflict therewith 
shall be of no further force or effect. They govern all 
proceedings in actions brought after they take effect and also 
all further proceedings in actions then pending, except to the 
extent that in the opinion of the court their application in 
a particular action pending when the rules take effect would 
not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the 
former procedure applies. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12(b) and (h): 
Rule 12. Defenses and Objections 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to 
claim for relief in any pleading. whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
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required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join 
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted. No defense or objection is waived by being joined 
with one or more other defenses or objections in a responsive 
pleading or motion or by further pleadings after the denial 
of such motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve 
a responsive pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense 
in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion 
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of 
the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not 
excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for 
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and 
all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present 
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56. 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and 
objections which he does not present either bv motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to 
join an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to 
state a legal defense to a claim may also be made by a later 
pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion for judgment on 
the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) 
that, whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or 
otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject 
matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection or 
defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as 
provided in Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may 
have been received. (Emphasis added). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant owned a storage unit which he rented to 
Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs stored furniture and equipment in the unit 
and placed a lock thereon. Defendant, without authority from 
Plaintiffs, broke the lock and sold the contents to a third party. 
Plaintiffs brought an action to recover the items or, in lieu 
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thereof, to recover damages and later amended the complaint 
alleging, among other claims, a claim for Forcible Entry and 
Detainer. Defendant answered, generally denying Plaintiffs1 
allegations. Defendant failed to allege any defense based on 
insufficiency of process. The jury by special verdict determined 
Plaintiffs' damages to be $7,000. Plaintiffs moved to have the 
damages trebled pursuant to the Forcible Entry and Detainer 
statute. The court ruled that Plaintiffs were not entitled to 
treble damages because Plaintiffs did not have an endorsement by 
the court upon the summons stating the number of days within which 
the Defendant shall be required to appear and defend the action, 
which shall not be less than three or more than twenty days from 
date of service, as provided by 78-36-8 UCA 1953 and therefor the 
action cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible Entry 
and Detainer statute. 
Plaintiffs assert that under Rule 12(b) and (h) that 
insufficiency of process is an affirmative defense which was waived 
by the Defendant by failure to assert that defense. The issue for 
review is whether or not the court erred in ruling that the 
Defendant had not waived his right to assert the insufficiency of 
process pursuant to Rule 12(b) and (h) and in ruling that the 
$7,000 verdict should not be trebled. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiffs stored household furnishings in a storage unit 
owned by Defendant. Defendant admitted in paragraph 15 of his 
answer: 
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Defendants removed or caused to be removed all 
of Plaintiffs1 property that was stored in the 
storage unit without any notice or claim under 
the provisions of Exhibit A or as required by 
the Utah Self Storage Facilities Act . . . as 
then in effect. 
The jury in a special verdict determined that Plaintiffs1 
damage from the unlawful entry was in the amount of $7,000 based 
upon the value of the items taken by Defendant. The court refused 
to treble that amount upon the premise that in order to have an 
unlawful detainer action, there must be an endorsement upon the 
summons setting forth the time for answer, which had not been done. 
The original complaint was not one in unlawful detainer. The 
complaint alleged negligence, breach of contract, breach of 
warranty and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant was served with 
a usual twenty-day summons. Defendant failed to answer and a 
default judgment was entered. Defendant than moved to set aside 
the default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect. The 
judgment was set aside. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint 
to add several causes of action including an action in forcible 
entry seeking treble damages (paragraph 28 of the amended 
complaint). Defendant simply denied said allegations (paragraph 
25 of his answer). Defendant, by his answer, raised no issue as 
to the sufficiency of process. 
Plaintiffs asserted that by failing to present the defense of 
insufficiency of process either by motion or in his answer he had 
waived said defense as provided in Rule 12(b) and (h) URCP. The 
court refused to so rule. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
78-36-10 UCA provides that judgment shall be entered against 
the Defendant for three times the amount of damages assessed by the 
jury in the event of unlawful entry. The entry was unlawful. It 
violated the terms of the storage agreement and of the Utah Self 
Storage Facilities Act because the entry was without notice and 
because of the violence in cutting the lock to gain entry. 
The forcible entry and detainer statute applies to commercial 
buildings as well as to residences. 
The damages resulting from forcible entry include the value 
of household goods and personal effects removed. 
Trebling is mandatory. 
Defendant failed to set forth any objection to the sufficiency 
of process by motion or in his answer. By failing to do so and by 
going to trial, he has waived that defense pursuant to Rules 12(b) 
and (h) URCP. 
ARGUMENT 
Unlawful Entry 
Defendant admitted in paragraph 15 of his answer that he 
entered Plaintiffs' storage unit and removed their possessions 
without any required notice. He stated: 
Defendants removed or caused to be removed all 
of Plaintiffs1 property that was stored in the 
storage unit without any notice or claim under 
the provisions of Exhibit A or as required by 
the Utah Self Storage Facilities Act . . . as 
then in effect. 
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The Exhibit "A" referred to above with which Defendant admits 
he did not comply is the rental agreement, Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 1. 
It provides when the Defendant may remove the lock* It states: 
Occupant or Owner may terminate the Occupancy created by 
this Rental Agreement by delivering written notice to the 
other party of its intention to do so at least 15 days 
prior to the last day of the calendar month in which 
Occupancy will terminate. Any property left In the 
Storage Space after the date for which Occupant (sic) has 
given notice to terminate will be deemed abandoned bv the 
Occupant, After said date. Owner may remove any lock 
from the Storage Space and dispose of the contents 
thereof without notice or liability to the Occupant. 
Defendants therefore violated the provisions of the rental 
agreement, as well as the provisions of the Self Storage Act. 
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its Instruction 
Number 16, which states: 
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to be cut Plain-
tiffs1 lock on the door and removing all items of per-
sonal property of Plaintiffs were wrongful. 
Forcible Entry 
The acts of Defendant in cutting Plaintiffs1 lock and entering 
their storage unit constituted forcible entry. 78-36-1 defines 
forcible entry as follows: 
Every person is guilty of a forcible entry, who either: 
(1) by breaking open doors, windows or other parts 
of a house, or by fraud, intimidation or stealth, or by 
any kind of violence or circumstances of terror, enters 
upon or into any real property; . . . 
Violence 
In Buchanan v. Crites, 150 P.2d 100, 103, 104, (Utah 1944) the 
Utah Court, in considering an action for damages, construed the 
forcible entry provision. The court stated: 
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Under our statute any entry bv force is prohibited. 
Being prohibited, such entry was wrongful and the 
aggrieved party has his remedy. The Forcible Entry 
Statute expressed a policy that no person should enter 
by force, stealth, fraud or intimidation, premises of 
which another had peaceable possession. . . 
It is contended by the appellant that this was not 
an entry by "force" within the meaning of the statute. 
The Utah Act was copied from the California Code of Civil 
Procedure, Section 1159. In Winchester v. Becker, 4 
Cal.App. 382, 88 P. 296, 297, the defendant had entered 
the premises by means of a key on two different occasions 
while the plaintiff was absent. The court, construing 
the California Act, stated in holding that there had been 
a forcible entry: 
"The question is presented whether the defendant's 
entry made in the manner stated comes within the 
provisions of the first subdivision of section 1159 of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, by which every person is to 
be held to be guilty of a forcible entry who 'by breaking 
open doors, windows, or other parts of a house * * * 
enters upon or into any real property. f This question 
we think must be answered in the affirmative. The 
meaning of the provision is that any * * * force is to 
be regarded as fbreaking open' the door or window or 
house. This was the construction given to the term 
'break' as entering into the common-law definition of 
burglary, and we see no reason why a different construc-
tion should be given to it in the provision now under 
consideration." 
Here it is alleged that the defendant entered upon 
the premises in plaintiff's absence by unlocking the 
doors and removing the doors from their hinges. Under 
the authorities construing acts similar to the Utah Act, 
and under the acts similar to the Utah Act, and under 
the Utah statutes making it a forcible entry to enter by 
stealth, these facts sufficiently show a forcible entry. 
discussing the requisite force in order to come under the 
Entry Statutes, it is stated in 21 Proof of Facts 2d § 
Forcible entry is that made with actual physical 
force directed against the premises. . . 
21 POF 2d § 607 f 2 
Perhaps the clearest indication of a forcible entry, 
or of a forcible detainer following a peaceable entry, 
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is a showing of some physical damage to the persons or 
premises resulting from the entry or detainer. Where the 
property in question is enclosed by a fence or other 
barrier, it has been held that the breaking of such a 
barrier and the entry onto the property will constitute 
a forcible entry, regardless of whether there has been 
any further violence or threatened breach of the public 
peace. 
21 POF 2d § 607 J 3 
With even less force, where the defendant entered the property 
with the aid of a locksmith and changed all the locks on the 
building, it has been held that there was a forcible entry, even 
though there was no damage to the building. Karp v. Marcrolis, 323 
P.2d 557 (Cal.App. 1958); Jordan v.' Talbot, 361 P.2d 20 (Cal.1961). 
Commercial Building 
Although a frequent application of the Forcible Entry and 
Detainer Statute involves residential leases, the express language 
of 78-36-1 makes it applicable to "any real property". 
The extension of the act to any real property was clearly 
recognized in the early Utah case of Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal 
Company. 48 P. 148 (Utah 1897), which involved fenced land. 
The California Court has held that the California Act upon 
which the Utah Act was based applies to forcible entry to a commer-
cial building. The court held that where owners of certain 
premises entered such premises, which were in possession of plain-
tiffs, without legal process with the help of a locksmith, while 
plaintiffs were not physically in the building, and thereafter 
retained physical possession of the building, they were guilty of 
forcible entry, even though the building was a commercial building, 
and even though there was no violence or circumstances of terror. 
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In Karp v. Maraolis. 323 P.2d 557, 559 (Cal.App. 1958). The court 
stated: 
Defendants break Subdivision 1 of Section 1159 into 
two parts, reading it as if it applied to two kinds of 
structures, the first to a house, and the second to any 
other kind of building. They liken the word "house" to 
home, and say as the place entered is admittedly a com-
mercial building, there was no forcible entry because 
there was no "breaking open doors, windows, or other 
parts of a house". The argument is not without some 
logical basis, and may be a reasonable interpretation of 
the section. However, courts have always before now read 
this section as a whole without making any division of 
affected subjects as suggested by defendants. In each 
of the following cases there was no "breaking open doors, 
windows, or other parts", each involved a commercial 
building and forcible entry was found to exist in each 
instance. San Francisco & Suburban Home Bldg. Soc. v. 
Leonard, 17 Cal.App. 254, 119 P. 405 (business office); 
Rutledge v. Barger, 82 Cal.App. 356, 255 P. 537 (store 
building); Pacific States Auxiliary Corp. v. Farris, 118 
Cal.App. 522, 5 P.2d 452 (apartment house); Calidino 
Hotel Co. of San Bernardino v. Bank of America, etc., 31 
Cal.App. 2d 295, 87 P. 2d 923 (hotel) and Pickens v. 
Johnson, 107 Cal.App.2d 778, 238 P.2d 40 (tavern). 
Damages 
Damages resulting from forcible entry include the value of 
household goods and personal effects removed from the premises. 
Black Mountain Corp. v. Jowdv. 268 S.W. 794 (Ky. 1925). See also 
36A CJS Forcible Entry & Detainer § 109. 
In the leading Utah case of Forrester v. Cook, 292 P. 206, 
214, (Utah 1930) the court, in determining what should be trebled, 
stated: 
The Plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as are 
the natural and proximate consequences of the unlawful 
detainer. 
That such is the general rule is stated in 36A C.J.S. Forcible 
Entry & Detainer § 109: 
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The damages recoverable for wrongful dispossession 
of the defendant in a forcible entry and detainer 
proceeding are such a sum as will fairly and reasonably 
compensate him for the losses he has sustained as a 
result of the dispossession. 
The natural and proximate consequences of the forcible entry were 
the disposal by the Defendant of the contents of the storage unit. 
Trebling Is Mandatory 
In Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal Company, supra, 48 P. 148, 
150 (Utah 1897) , the Utah court long ago held that it was error for 
the trial court not to treble damages. The syllabus by the court 
stated: 
Appellant obtained judgment against the respondent, 
a corporation, for possession, and for damages resulting 
from an unlawful and forcible entry and detainer of lands 
he had obtained from the United States under the home-
stead laws; and the respondent still continued the un-
lawful and forcible detention of the premises after 
demand, and for about two years after judgment. In an 
action brought by the appellant, under sections 3787 and 
3801, Comp. Laws 1888, to recover damages for forcible 
and unlawful detention of the lands, subsequent to the 
judgment, and for treble damages, as provided for by 
statute, the jury found damages for appellant in the sum 
of $800. The court, on motion, declined to treble the 
damages. Held error, and that the court should have 
trebled the damages. 
The Eccles court stated: 
These damages are to be ascertained, or, in other words, 
assessed, by the Jury, or by the court acting without a 
jury, according to the truth of case; and, when this is 
done, it is made the duty of the court to treble them. 
. . . This action was properly brought under section 
3787, which deals with the subject of forcible entry and 
detainer; and we see no valid reason why the damages 
found for forcible detainer should not be trebled by the 
court, as provided by the act. Under the authorities, 
there seems to be no escape from this result. The plain-
tiff is entitled to have the damages for forcible and 
unlawful detainer trebled by the court, with costs. 
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Eccles was cited with approval Forrester v. Cook, supra, 292 
P. 206, 214 (Utah 1930), wherein the Utah court stated: 
The wording of the statute is "judgment shall be rendered 
against the defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or 
forcible or unlawful detainer, for the rent and for three 
times the amount of the damages thus assessed." This 
language has been held to require the entry of judgment 
for three times the amount of the damages, after a find-
ing of damages by the jury* Eccles v. Union Pacific Coal 
Co.. 15 Utah 14, 48 P. 148. That action was one for 
forcible and unlawful detainer, but the statute applies 
as well to unlawful detainer. The statute as construed 
in Eccles v. U.P. Coal Co.. supra, makes it mandatory 
upon the court to render judgment for three times the 
amount of damages thus assessed. 
These cases were followed in the Utah Court of Appeals 
decision in Monroe, Inc. v. Sidwell, 770 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Utah 
1989), wherein the Court stated it was mandatory to treble the 
damages found. 
All Elements of Forcible Entry 
And Detainer Are Present 
The court, in its order of July 12, 1991, stated: 
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its 
Instimetion Number 16, which states: 
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to 
be cut Plaintiffs' lock on the door and 
removing all items of personal property 
of Plaintiffs were wrongful. 
The court finds however that because 
Plaintiffs did not have an endorsement by the court 
upon the summons stating the number of days within 
which the Defendant shall be required to appear and 
defend the action, which shall not be less than 
three or more than twenty days from date of 
service, as required by 78-36-8 UCA 1953, that this 
cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible 
Entry and Detainer statute. 
The motion to treble damages is therefor 
denied. 
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Plaintiffs argued unsuccessfully to the trial court that 
treble damages must be awarded because Defendant waived his 
objection to the sufficiency of process; because obtaining the 
court's endorsement on the summons would have been a useless act; 
and because the two cases relied upon by Defendant are not 
controlling. 
Defendant Waived Any Objection 
To The Sufficiency Of Process 
The original complaint was not one in unlawful detainer. The 
complaint alleged negligence, breach of contract, breach of 
warranty and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant was served with 
a usual twenty-day summons. Defendant failed to answer and a 
default judgment was entered. Defendant then moved to set aside 
the default judgment on the grounds of excusable neglect. The 
judgment was set aside. Plaintiffs then amended their complaint 
to add several causes of action including an action in forcible 
entry, seeking treble damages (paragraph 28 of the amended 
complaint). Defendant simply denied said allegations (paragraph 
25 of his answer) and raised no issue as to the sufficiency of 
process. 
Rule 12(b) and (h) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide as 
follows: 
Defenses and Objections 
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to 
claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, 
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall be 
asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is 
required, except that the following defenses may at the option 
of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction 
over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the 
person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) 
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insufficiency of service of process, (6) failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join 
an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses 
shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is 
permitted. . . . 
(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and 
obj ections which he does not present either bv motion as 
hereinbefore provided or, if he has made no motion, in his 
answer or reply. . . 
Rule 1(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1950; and 
thereafter all laws in conflict therewith shall be of no 
further force or effect. . . 
That provision in Rule 1(b) leaves no doubt that if there is a 
conflict between it and the provisions of the unlawful detainer 
statute that the Rule prevails. In fact, however, there is no 
conflict because the unlawful detainer provision for endorsement 
on the summons is compatible with Rule 1. All the Defendant had 
to do was to raise the objection timely by motion or by answer. 
He raised no objection to sufficiency of process until after the 
trial and verdict. 
Obtaining The Court's Endorsement On The 
Summons Would Have Been A Useless Act 
The purpose of the statutory provision for the court's 
endorsement on the summons of the time within which Defendant 
should plead is to give Plaintiffs the opportunity to have a speedy 
remedy. The court can order that an answer be filed within three 
to twenty days under 78-36-8 UCA. Here Plaintiffs did not seek a 
shortening of the usual twenty-day time period and so the full 
amount of time was given by the summons. Having the court endorse 
a twenty-day time period would have been superfluous. 
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A Second Summons Is Not Contemplated By The Rules 
The summons issued before the addition of the forcible entry 
claim was adequate. Defendant appeared in the action after the 
amendment of the complaint added the forcible entry claim. 
Issuance of a second summons was uncalled for. 
The Two Cases Relied Upon By Defendant 
Are Not Controlling 
Defendant cites Gerard v. Young, 432 P2d 343 (Utah 1967) and 
Pinaree v. Continental Group of Utah, Inc. , 558 P2d 1317 (Utah 
1976), both stating that in a forcible entry and detainer action 
there must be an endorsement by the court on the summons of the 
time within which to answer. In neither of those cases was the 
issue raised by the parties in either the lower court or the 
supreme court of whether or not there must be such an endorsement. 
Consequently, in neither case was the waiver of defense provided 
by Rule 12 discussed nor was it ruled upon. This is disclosed by 
the briefs on appeal of both parties on file in the supreme court 
library, pertinent excerpts of which are attached. 
In Gerard, there actually was no pleading even alleging 
forcible entry and detainer. The complaint was merely for 
cancellation of lease and for restitution. There was an answer 
denying the right of cancellation and restitution. On a motion for 
summary judgment, the Defendant argued there were issues of fact 
precluding summary judgment. Notwithstanding the fact that the 
action was not one in forcible entry and detainer, the trial court 
not only cancelled the lease but determined the amount of damages 
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and trebled them. On appeal the supreme court ruled that there was 
an issue of fact as to damages and that any award thereof on a 
summary judgment was improper. The supreme court necessarily ruled 
that if there was no determination of damage, there of course, 
could be no trebling. Only as an additional reason for its 
decision did the court state that there was no endorsement upon the 
summons. Not only was this not a forcible entry action, but also 
no one raised or considered the rule that a defense of 
insufficiency of process was waived pursuant to Rule 12. 
In Pinaree, as shown by the briefs of both parties on appeal, 
no issue was raised concerning the endorsement on the summons of 
the number of days for appearance. The cross-appellant argued that 
the trial court's refusal to treble damages was error. Appellant 
argued that the refusal was correct because the notice to vacate 
the premises was deficient, the rentals had been paid and no 
damages had been shown for refusal to vacate. There was no 
reference by either party to the sufficiency of process. The 
parties, the lower court and the supreme court therefor did not 
reach the issue of waiver of defense set forth in Rule 12. That 
defense was not just untimely, it was never raised. 
CONCLUSION 
Damages must be trebled because: 
(a) All elements of forcible entry and detainer are 
present. 
(b) The Defendant entered his appearance which does away 
with the necessity for any summons and any endorsement thereon. 
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(c) Having the court endorse on the summons that an 
answer must be filed within twenty days would have been superfluous 
since that was what it already provided. Shortening of time to 
answer was not sought nor obtained. 
(d) By not timely raising the issue, pursuant to Rule 
12, Defendant has waived the issue of sufficiency of process. 
(e) The Gerard and Pinaree cases are not controlling, 
principally because the issue of waiver was not seen nor raised by 
the parties nor the courts. 
Respectfully submitted this /y day of August, 1991. 
c^/^^C^ 2-J vZgr-^  
John W. Lowe, Attorney for 
Nglaintiffs/Appellants 
1624 Orchard Drive 
P. 0. Box 520003 
Salt Lake City, UT 84152-0003 
-20-
A D D E N D A 
John W. Lowe, No, 2001 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1624 Orchard Drive 
P. 0. Box 520003 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-0003 
Telephone: (801) 486-5287 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. FOWLER and 
SHERRIL FOWLER, ORDER AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT 
: INTEREST AND DENYING 
Plaintiffs, TREBLE DAMAGES 
: Civil No. 880906180CV 
TERRY R. SEITER, 
: Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
This matter came on for trial. The jury awarded Plaintiffs 
the sum of $7,000 as damages. Plaintiffs then moved to have pre-
judgment interest awarded and to treble the $7,000 awarded by the 
jury as damages, the trebling to be pursuant to Forcible Entry and 
Detainer statute 78-36-10 UCA. 
Plaintiffs filed a memorandum in support of their motions. 
Defendant filed a memorandum objecting to the motions and Plaintiffs 
filed a reply memorandum. The court considered the memoranda and 
filed a minute entry awarding interest at the rate of $1.91 per day 
but denying the trebling of damages. 
PRIOR ORDERS SET ASIDE 
IT IS ORDERED that the orders awarding pre-judgment interest 
and denying treble damages, signed by the court on June 12, 1991 
are both set aside. 
JUL 2 1991 
sy. 
L«l-M.> ^.^. 
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PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST 
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiffs are awarded pre-judgment interest 
at the rate of $1.91 per day from the date of the damages June 22, 
1988 to the date of judgment. 
TREBLE DAMAGES 
The court recognized the wrongful entry in its Instruction 
Number 16, which states: 
Defendant's acts in cutting or causing to be cut Plain-
tiffs1 lock on the door and removing all items of per-
sonal property of Plaintiffs were wrongful. 
The court finds however that because Plaintiffs did not have 
an endorsement by the court upon the summons stating the number of 
days within which the Defendant shall be required to appear and 
defend the action, which shall not be less than three or more than 
twenty days from date of service, as required by 78-36-8 UCA 1953, 
that this cannot be deemed to be an action under the Forcible Entry 
and Detainer statute. 
The motion to treble damages is therefor denied. 
The court makes the express determination that there is no 
just reason for delay and the court expressly directs entry of 
judgment on these orders. 
Dated this o£ day of July, 1991. 
A. 
John A. Rokich, Judge 
" CEqilPY THAT TMIQ i - A ,-
OniG,NAL DOCUJST C N ? S r C 0 P Y Oh X 
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°UTT COURT n.pn'" 
CERTIFICATE OP SERVICE 
It is hereby certified that a copy of the foregoing ORDER 
AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST AND DENYING TREBLE DAMAGES was hand 
delivered to Defendant's counsel, Charles W. Hanna, SMITH & HANNA, 
311 South State Street, Suite #450, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on 
this JAJ day of July, 1991. 
AM6L*~JT7^) 
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Thirc" Jud.cial District 
John W. Lowe, No. 2001 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1624 Orchard Drive 
P. O. Box 520003 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84152-0003 
Telephone: (801) 486-5287 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JAMES N. FOWLER and 
SHERRIL FOWLER, J U D G M E N T 
Plaintiffs, : £V£lSl%G 
: Civil No. 880906180CV 
TERRY R. SEITER, 
: Judge John A. Rokich 
Defendant. 
This action came on for trial before the court and a jury, 
Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge presiding, and the issues 
having been duly tried and the jury having duly entered its verdict. 
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Plaintiffs James N. Fowler and 
Sherril Fowler recover of the Defendant Terry R. Seiter the sum of 
$7,000 together with pre-judgment interest at the rate of 10% per 
annum from June 22, 1988 to date of judgment in the amount $1.91 
per diem, which pre-judgment interest is in the amount of $2,154.48 
which principal and pre-judgment interest are in the amount of 
$9,154.48, together with interest from date of judgment at the rate 
of 12% per annum as provided by law and their costs of action. 
JUL 2 6 1991 
By Jrr&Vtcabc.i >JZ„ ., 
D&puiy Cl«f K 
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Inasmuch as an appeal is pending on the court's order denying 
the trebling of damages, the amount of costs shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. 
Dated this o?£ day of July, 1991-
/?(^J?LJJ 
Clerk of the Court 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS 18 A TRUE COPY OF AN 
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH. t 
HATP. LA,, ' ^ L f f l t 
lul—e. *& o~M» 
DEPUTY COURT CLERK 
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INI THE SUPREME COURT 
DF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Y LOUISE GERARD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
PRESTON L. YOUNG and 
JJNICE YOUNG, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
10712 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff-Respondent 
seeking to forfeit a lease for a term of years based on 
Defendants-Appellants' alleged "payoffs" on pinball ma-
chines and punch boards. Delinquent rental is not an 
issue. 
This action has been treated as if in unlawful 
detainer under 78-36-1, et seq., 1953 UCA, though not 
pleaded. The pleading theory of plaintiff is that a lease 
provision has been violated by defendants and the lease 
should be rescinded, (R2, Paragraph 6). 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The following hurried sequence of events took* 
place: 
1. Complaint for lease cancellation and for restitu-j 
tion of the leasehold was filed June 13, 1966 (R. 1 Jo-
Time for answer was shortened to three days, arranged 
ex parte, with no reference to statutory authority, if any,^  
to do it (R. 1, 2, 3) . 78-36-8, 1953 UCA seems to re-1 
quire a rental delinquency in order for the court to 
shorten time of answer. i 
2. Answer was filed June 15, denying gambling; 
or right to restitution of premises if there was gambling! 
3. Defendants-Appellants filed motion for summary" 
judgment on June 15, 1966 (R. 12), noticed for argu-4 
ment July 5, 1966 (R. 11). f 
4. Counsel for plaintiff-respondent obtained special 
pretrial setting for 12 p.m., June 22, 1966, though 
notice of readiness for trial was not filed by plaintiffs 
until July 1,1966 (R. 22). 
5. There was no judge for the special pretrial hear-
ing on June122, 1966, so plaintiff continued it to Jur|e/ 
24, 1966. On June 24, the pretrial judge ordered a
 v 
further pretrial to be held on September 30, 1966 and; 
placed the case on the jury trial calendar'for October 
26, 1966. £ 
6. On July 30, 1966, plaintiff-respondent filed mo-r 
tion fo? summary judgment, also to be heard on July 5j 
1966 (R. 14). 
I 7. Plaintiff-respondent's motion for summary judg-
ement was supported by three affidavits alleging receipts 
\pi "payoffs" at the leasehold premises, (R. 16, 17, 19). 
^Defendants-appellants filed an affidavit in opposition to 
'plaintiff's affidavits stating there was no acquaintance 
vfith plaintiff's affiants and that defendants-appellants 
;)vere entitled to examine those persons under oath and 
itest their veracity and interest in the subject of the liti-
gation to overcome the self-serving nature and hearsay 
characteristics in those affidavits submitted by plaintiff, 
-(It. 23). 
8. Both motions for summary judgment were argued 
July 5, 1966. 
-.<£, 9. Memorandum decision granting plaintiff-respond-
ent's motion for summary judgment was issued by the 
Jrial Court July 6, 1966 (R. 25). 
^ 10. On July 8, 1966 defendants-appellants made 
motion for reconsideration of the memorandum deci-
sion (R..29), which was supported by further affidavit 
of defendants-appellants stating that the affidavits per-
taining to "payoffs" were, to the best knowledge and 
jbelief of affiant, false (R. 26). 
11. Based upon the motion to reconsider, with sup-
porting affidavit, the Court ordered both parties' motions 
*or summary judgment denied and ordered that the 
^matter remain on the pretrial calendar for Fridky, Sep-
tember 30, 1966 and that Trial be held Wednesday, 
October 26, 1966, as previously scheduled. The Court 
,in the order of July 8, affirmatively found that there 
were questions of fact to be determined at trial (R. 30). 
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12. On July 13, again ex parte, plaintiffs counsel \ 
obtained a trial setting for July 19, 1966 (R. 34), de-
spite the July 8 order that trial would be October 26, 
1966 (R. 30). 
13. On July 13, 1966, defendants-appellants filed ; 
objection to the July 19 trial setting (R. 33), noticing il 
hearing on objection for July 18, 1966 (R. 31). Hearing ? 
on the objection was had before the Honorable Albert i 
H. Ellett, who refused to proceed with the matter since . 
the special trial setting had been obtained before the | 
Honorable Stewart M. Hanson. The court was on vaca-
tion on July 19, 1966, with no reporter and no jury* 
was on hand, despite defendants-appellants demand for 
jury having been filed and a jury fee having been paid f 
(R. 32). \ 
i 
Trial was not held July 19, 1966, though plaintiff's * 
counsel offered to obtain a court reporter and pay for 
him. Plaintiff's counsel was not, however, successful in | 
persuading the clerk of the court to summons a jury, in 
the face of appellant's objection. 
14. July 19, 1966, defendants-appellants filed peti-
tion to the Supreme Court of Utah for an interlocutory; 
appeal, which was denied by the court in Case 10692, 
July 27, 1966. 
, 15. Under date of July 19, 1966, plaintiff-respond-, 
ent noticed the taking of defendant's deposition for July/ 
26, 1966. Notice was filed with the Court July 27, 1966^  
(R.34). / 
16. The deposition of defendant, Preston L. Young, $ 
was taken July 29, 1966 (R. 60). He refused to answer4* 
questions concerning pinballs and punch boards based 
> on the self-incrimination provisions of the 5th amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. 
17. Under date of July 21, 1966 plaintiff-respond-
ent again filed motion for summary judgment based 
upon previous allegations and affidavits set forth in the 
. first motion for summary judgment heard on July 5, 
1966. The motion was filed July 27. (R. 36). 
18. The same matter having already been argued 
and ruled on by the Trial Court, was again heard and 
agrued on August 9, 1966. 
19. On August 9, 1966, the day of the second argu-
ment, the Trial Court made and entered its order grant-
ing plaintiff-respondent's latest motion for summary 
judgment, from which order this appeal is taken. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
1. Defendants-appellants seek decision that having 
pinballs and punch boards on cafe premises, even if 
"payoffs" are made, is not sufficient grounds to found 
an action in unlawful detainer. 
2. Appellants seek ruling that if there were "pay-
offs" on pinball machines and punch boards then the 
Utah gambling statutes are unconstitutional and such 
| conduct is not unlawful. 
3. In the alternative, appellants seek ruling that the 
issue of gambling be decided by a jury; and that gamb-
ling, if any, as an "unlawful business" under 78-36-3(4), 
U953 UCA, or as a "material breach" of lease be de-
termined by a jury these questions being issues of fact, 
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Gerard v. Young 
432 P2d 343 (Utah 1967) 
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As to the second point, 78-36-3, UCA, 1953, pro-
vides: J 
c 
"UNLAWFUL DETAINER BY TENANT FOB TERM *j 
LESS THAN LIFE. — A Tenant of real property, for c 
a term less than life, is guilty of an unlawful de- § 
tainer: g 
(4) When he assigns or sublets the leased 
premises contrary to the covenants of the lease, or 
commits or permits waste thereon, or when he 
sets up or carries on therein or thereon any tins-
lawful business, or when he suffers, permits or 
maintains on or about said premises any nuisance, 
and remains in possession after service upon him 
of a three days* notice to quit; or, 
(5) When he continues in possession, in person 
or by subtenant, after neglect or failure to per-
form any condition or covenant of the lease or 
agreement under which the property is held, other 
than those hereinbefore mentioned, and after no-
tice in writing requiring in the alternative the 
performance of such conditions or covenant or the 
surrender of the property, served upon him, and, 
if there is a subtenant in actual occupation of 
the premises, also upon such subtenant, shall re-
main uncomplied with for five days after service 
thereof. Within three days after the service of the 
notice the tenant, or any subtenant in actual occu-
pation of the premises, or any mortgagee of the 
9 
term, or other person interested in its continuance, * 
may perform such condition or covenant and* 
thereby save the lease from forfeiture; provided, 
that if the covenants and conditions of the lease 
violated by the lessee cannot afterwards be per-^  
formed, then no notice as last prescribed herein 
need be given/' (Emphasis added) 
It should be noted that while the unlawful detainer, 
statutes have a number of precise
 (conditions concerning 
due notice, that defendants have stated no point denying 
proper notice at any point in the proceedings before the 
trial Court or this court. 
Is the gambling of sufficient substance to justify^ 
lease terminationt The facts show a continuous course" 
of gambling. While the affidavits of the Hansons (R. 17-^  
19) relate only isolated instances, the Complaint charges > 
a course of gambling and of maintaining machines for, 
that purpose at the cafe, as does the affidavit of Evan 
Holladay (R. 16). As stated in Point I, these allega-f 
tions not having been denied are deemed admitted. 
The gambling is substantial when viewed from plaint 
tiff 9s eyes because, as lessor, she herself is liable to crimi* 
nal prosecution if she allows gambling on the premise^ 
she has leased. 76-27-3 UCA, 1953, and 4-10-2, Salt Lake' 
County Ordinances, Revised, 1953. The defendants haifr 
ing refused to desist, she has the duty of forcing them to, 
which this lawsuit hopes to do. The rule is stated ' 
Zotalis v. Catmellos et al, 164 NW 807 (Minn.), which 
held shaking dice for cigars was grounds for lease ter 
mination based on a lease term against gambling: 
10 
•'The violation of a condition in the lease cannot 
be said to be trivial when the violation is of such 
a character that the lessor may be subjected to a 
criminal prosecution therefore." 
Finally, 78-36-3(5) UCA, 1953, makes no distinction 
between great and small breaches of a lease, nor is there 
a Utah case on this point. To satisfy this statute what is 
required is only that a breach be proved and that after 
notice given pursuant to the statute, that the breach con-
tinue. On this there is no argument on the facts as 
Widenced by the unrebutted affidavits of Bryant and 
Larry A. Hanson as to payoffs, on May 21, 1966, and 
%ne 3, 1966 (R. 17-19), with notice under 78-3-36(4)& 
(5) UCA, 1953, previously served on April 12, 1966 
j(R. 4, 5). Gilbert v. Peck, 121 P. 315 (Calif.); 32 Am. 
'Jur., Landlord and Tenant, §864, pp. 731; 100 ALR 2d 
469 et seq. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the summary judg-
ent is well supported by the facts and law and should 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, /y/ 
/£'#Mte K. SAMUEL KING 
Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Respdndent 
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.graph 20 of the lease presently before the Court. These 
ces informed the appellant that the respondents elected 
eclare a forfeiture of the lease upon the failure of 
llant to cure the defects and that appellant would, in 
event of such a failure, become a tenant at will. They 
Id be approved and confirmed in all respects. 
POINT IV 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN CON-
ING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO TREBLE 
GES PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, §78-36-10. 
The appellant admitted service of respondents1 
er dated September 24, 1974, directing that certain 
irs be undertaken within 30 days or the lease-would be 
eited (Amended Complaint para. 18 and Amended Answer 
. 17); admitted service of respondentsf notice dated 
nary 12, 1975 (Amended Complaint para. 21 and 22, 
led Answer para. 20 and 21) ; and admitted his refusal to 
te the premises pursuant to said notice (Amended Complaint 
. 23, Amended Answer para. 22) . The trial court found 
the indicated repairs and maintenance had not been 
Leted (Findings of Fact NoV..^  34 and 35 and Memorandum 
sion at 5-6), found damages to be $4,000 (Finding of 
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Fact No. 39 and Memorandum Decision at 6), found appellantfs 
failure to vacate wrongful and anN unlawful holdover (Finding 
of Fact No. 56 and Memorandum Decision at 6-7) , and found 
damages in the nature of rent after forfeiture to be $900 
per month (Finding of Fact No. 57 and Memorandum Decision at 
7). 
The trial court considered but refused to find 
treble damages for the wrongful and unlawful holdover (Find-
ing of Fact No. 59 and Memorandum Decision at 7) . The 
respondents believe this finding of the trial court is 
incorrect. Utah Code Annotated 1953, §78-36-10 states in 
part 
. . . judgment shall be rendered against the 
defendant guilty of the forcible entry, or forcible or 
unlawful detainer, for rent and for three times the 
amount of damages thus assessed. 
This is the exact same language which the court 
had occasion to review in Forrester v. Cook, 77 U. 137, 292 
P. 206, 213 (1930). The court states 
This language has been held to require the entry 
of judgment for three times the amount of damages, 
after a finding of damages by the [court]. Eccles v. 
Union Pacific-Coal Co., 15 Utah, 14, 48 P. 148. That 
action was one for forcible and unlawful detainer, but 
the statute applies as well to unlawful detainer. The 
statute as construed in Eccles v. U. P. Coal Co., 
supra, makes it mandatory upon the court to render 
judgment for three times the amount of damages thus 
assessed. Id. at 214. 
The court goes on to define what is meant by the term "damages" 
which are trebled. The appellant correctly points out to 
the Court that such damages must be the natural and proxi-
mate consequence of the unlawful detainer (Brief of Appel-
lant at 17) , but he failed to point out to the Court what 
those consequences were. The court in Forrester said 
The damages which may be recovered in an action 
such as this are measured by the rule that they must be 
the natural and proximate consequences of the acts 
complained of and nothing more. Rents and profits, or 
rental value of the premises, during detention are 
included in damages, (emphasis added), IcL. at 211. 
The second claim for relief in respondentsf Amended 
Complaint deals strictly with the fact appellant" refused to 
vacate the premises as directed. It is the unlawful deten-
tion of the premises which triggers the measure of damages. 
The court stated 
Clearly the loss of the value of the use and 
occupation of the premises, or the rental value thereof, 
during the period when the premises were unlawfully 
withheld from plaintiff, is a damage suffered by her. 
While damages may not be restricted to the rental value 
and may include more, yet the rental value during the 
unlawful withholding of possession is the minimum of 
damages. Id. at 214. 
In this case, appellant was in unlawful detention 
from and after five days of service of respondentsf notice 
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on his legal counsel, or at the latest March 4, 1975. This 
unlawful detainer continued through January 15, 1976, when 
\ 
the sheriff served the Writ of Possession placing respondents 
in possession of the premises. 
So there would be no misunderstanding regarding 
damages, the court went on to distinquish ,frents which 
accrued before forfeiture11 from "damages accruing after 
forfeiture11 based on the rental value of the unlawfully 
detained premises. It stated 
Rents, which may not be trebled, are such as 
accrue before termination of the tenancy. After the 
tenancy has been terminated by notice required by 
statute, the person in unlawful possession is not owing 
rent under the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to law. Rental value or reasonable value of 
the use and occupation of the premises becomes an 
element of damages for retaining possession. This is 
not rent, it is damages. Id. at 214. 
Respondents have suffered additional damages as a 
natural and proximate result of appellantfs unlawful holdover 
in that the condition of the premises continued to decline. 
The building exterior was not painted and the bare wood 
continued to weather, the public restroom and kitchen floors 
were not repaired, the kitchen walls continued to deteriorate 
from the moisture put out by the ice machine as a result of 
appellant's refusal to relocate it, and the blocked off 
- 42 -
restrooms continued to be exposed to the effects of inclement 
weather. Respondents were unable to correct these deficiencies 
as a result of appellant's refusal to vacate and had no oppor-
tunity so to do prior to January 15, 1975. 
The portion of the trial courtfs Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Decree denying treble 
damages for unlawful -detainer should be reversed and the 
matter remanded to the trial court for the entry of appro-
priate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment 
and Decree awarding respondents the treble damages to which 
they were properly entitled. The respondents should be 
awarded their costs and a reasonable attorneyfs fee in con-
junction with this appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted: 
(a) The trial court erred as a matter of law 
in not concluding that the lease renewal option was void 
for vagueness and uncertainty. 
(b) The trial court erred as a matter of law 
in not awarding treble damages for unlawful detainer. 
(c) In all other respects, the trial court's 
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All of these cases involve a renewal option 
with rentals to be renegotiated by agreement of the 
parties. None of the cases had the benefit of having 
specified factors to be used in considering the basis for 
the rental negotiation. As was stated in Hall v. 
Weatherford, 32 Ariz. 370, 259 P. 282, options to renew 
granted to the lessee are obviously for his benefit and/ 
it is presumed/ are part of the consideration which induced 
him to execute the lease. 
It has also been held that where an agreement to 
renew contained in a lease is independent from other 
covenants such as to keep the premises in repair, it does 
not release the lessor from his obligation to renew or 
extend/ even if the covenant to keep premises in repair is 
breached. See Parsons v. Ball/ 205 Ky. 793/ 266 S. W. 649. 
Therefore, the respondents could not use their complaints 
concerning maintenance of the premises as grounds for 
failure to reasonably renegotiate the new rentals. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN NOT AWARDING-
TREBLE DAMAGES TO RESPONDENTS. 
The respondents/ in the statement of points in 
their-cross-appeal—have- stated-thatr 1:he-lower~^ourt 
^ A l i a n H q R H e f vi ncrree 
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errored iir concluding that they were not entitled to\ 
N \ 
treble damages pursuant to*Utah Code Annotated/- 1952> 
78-J6-10. 
First/' the Notice to vacate is deficient on 
its face in not .requiring, in the alternative, the 
performance of the conditions of which they complain 
or surrender of the property. 
Second, respondents' Notice to vacate was only .-
premised upon appellant's failure'to make certain, repairs. 
That would be the only claim which would be within the 
provisions of the unlawful detainer statute. The appellant 
had continued to pay the monthly rentals of $500.00 per 
month and was not. in an unlawful detainer situation by 
refusing to pay the higher^rental demanded by respondents. 
There has never been any claim by respondents 
that appellant was unlawfully detaining the premises by 
hi^ failure to pay the increased rentals as. demanded. 
It has been held that the damages which are 
comtemplated-by the treble damages provision of the 
statute must be the natural and proximate consequences 
of th&-unlawful detainer and nothing more. See Forrester v. 
^Cooky 77 U. 137, 292 F. 206. 
Since .the respondents' claim under the unlawful 
18 
detainer statute is based upon allegations of disrepair, 
they must show that additional damages occurred as a 
\ 
result of appellantfs failure to remove himself from the 
premises. This was not done. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that the damages awarded for 
delayed maintenance were excessive in light of the 
evidence and many of them should have been awarded against 
the defendant, the Continental Group of Utah, Inc. 
The Court failed to consider the factors 
specified in the Lease in determining increased rentals 
for the renewal period and errored in holding that the 
rentals should have been $900.00 per month. 
Treble damages are not applicable to the 
facts of this case since there is no evidence to show 
that respondents were damaged by appellant's holdover 
in the specific area of delayed maintenance. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUTCHISON 
R. FLORENCE 
818-26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Appellant 
Leslie W. Van Antwerp, Jr, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
It is hereby certified by the undersigned that four copies of 
the foregoing APPELLANTS1 BRIEF were mailed, postage prepaid, on 
this of August, 1991 to the following: 
Charles W. Hanna 
SMITH & HANNA 
311 South State Street, #450 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
/s/ John W. Lowe 
